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CASE LAW UPDATE:
20.080 Requirements and
the
Advance Payment Statute
A recent pair of decisions from
Oregon courts has clarified the meanings of two statutes
which are often the source of concern to the insurance
industry. In Johnson v. Swaim, ___ Or App ___,
(November 15, 2006), the court discussed the procedural
requirements for a written demand sufficient to set up a
claim for attorneys fees under ORS 20.080. In
Hamilton v. Paynter, ___ Or ___ (December 7, 2006),
the court held that the statute of limitations may be
suspended by an advance payment under ORS 12.155 even
when the advance payment is made by an individual rather
than an insurer.
In Johnson v. Swaim, ___ Or App ___, (November
15, 2006), the defendant appealed a trial court award of
attorney fees under ORS 20.080 after a jury returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff for damages in a motor
vehicle accident on October 4, 2001. The defendant
appealed, arguing that the plaintiff failed to comply
with the procedural requirements of ORS 20.080 by
failing to make a “written demand for the payment of
[the] claim … not less than 10 days before the
commencement of the action.” The Oregon Court of Appeals
agreed with the defendant and reversed the award of
attorney fees.
The court focused on three communications from the
plaintiff. On July 11, 2002, plaintiff sent a letter to
the defendant’s insurer stating that “a claim is being
pursued” and suggesting that the adjuster leave the
matter open “until fair and full compensation is paid
for all losses.” The court of appeals held that the
letter failed to satisfy the statutory requirements
because it did not contain a written demand for a
specific dollar amount. Under Lander v. E. Texas
Motor Frt. Lines, 266 Or 473 (1973), a written
statement that plaintiff is pursuing a claim under ORS
20.080 would sufficiently specify that the dollar amount
of the claim is $5,500 (or less). However, plaintiff’s
July 11, 2002 letter gave no indication of the dollar
amount of the demand, nor did it state that a claim was
made pursuant to ORS 20.080.
On October 14, 2003, plaintiff spoke with another
adjuster and orally demanded $5,000.00 in damages. The
court held that this communication did not satisfy ORS
20.080 because it was not a “written demand.”
Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that this
oral conversation, combined with the July 11, 2002
letter, satisfied the requirements of ORS 20.080,
because the “writing” must contain the reference to a
specific dollar amount.
On September 29, 2003, plaintiff’s attorney sent a
letter demanding $5,500 pursuant to ORS 20.080. This
letter was sent shortly before the claim was about to
expire pursuant to the two year statute of limitations.
The next day, a Complaint was filed seeking $5,500 in
damages. The court held that the letter did not meet the
requirements of ORS 20.080, because it was not sent at
least ten days prior to the filing of a Complaint.
The plaintiff also argued that the defendant had waived
the requirements of ORS 20.080 when defendant’s
insurance adjuster wrote one week after the Complaint
was filed that “pursuant to ORS 20.080, I am offering
your client $500.00.” The court held that this statement
did not constitute a waiver of the right to have
plaintiff comply with the statutory requirements,
because there was no intentional relinquishment of a
known right. Thus, it appears that a fairly strict
compliance with the statute is still required in order
for a plaintiff to perfect the right to an attorney fee
award under ORS 20.080.
In Hamilton v. Paynter, ___ Or ___ (December 7,
2006), the Oregon Supreme Court held that ORS 12.155,
the advance payment statute, applied to payments made by
individuals as well as insurers, overruling the Oregon
Court of Appeals. In Hamilton, the plaintiff was
injured on August 19, 2001, when her car was rear ended
by a forklift operated by defendant George Paynter and
owned by defendants Carvalho Fisheries Inc. and William
Carvalho. On November 2, 2001, defendants gave plaintiff
$1000 as a “partial payment.” Plaintiff did not file an
action until November 28, 2003, two years and three
months after the accident. However, the plaintiff
claimed that the two year statute of limitations was
suspended by ORS 12.155 because an advance payment was
given without notification that payment would not
suspend the statute of limitations. The defendants
claimed that they were not “persons” who made payment
under the ORS 12.155, relying on language from prior
decisions indicating that the statute only applied to
insurers who have made payments in the third party
context.
The court held that statutory term “persons” included
individuals, and not just insurers. Although there were
indications that the legislature intended the rule to be
applied to insurers, the legislature ultimately passed a
broader rule which would allow tolling of the statute of
limitations when any person, including an individual,
makes an advance payment.
Because the advance payment statute applies to payments
made by individuals, insurers should take care in
determining whether their insureds have made any
payments for any reason to third party claimants. If an
insured has paid a third party claimant, this may toll
the statute of limitations.
Please direct any questions in this area of law to the
author, Flavio (Alex) Ortiz or Marty Rall at Lachenmeier
Enloe Rall & Heinson, at 503-768-9600, or by email to
alex@lerlaw.com or
marty@lerlaw.com.
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